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INFORMAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND DISASTER
PLANNING: THE CASE OF WILDFIRE
Stephen R. Miller*, Jaap Vos**, & Eric Lindquist***
I. INTRODUCTION
Never has disaster planning been more important than in this time of
the climate’s change. In the western United States, climate change has
produced a number of stark effects already evident. None, however, is more
dramatic than wildfire’s growth from seasonal annoyance to nearly yearround threat to life.1 These climatic changes butt up against the West’s
extraordinary population growth, which brings the urban edge of population
*
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Berkeley; J.D. University of California, Hastings. Member, American Institute of
Certified Planners. The author serves as principal investigator on a three-year
Landscape Scale Restoration Project Grant (Grant) from the U.S. Forest Service,
which is managed by the Idaho Department of Lands. This project is funded in part
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1. See generally STEPHEN R. MILLER ET AL., PLANNING FOR WILDFIRE IN THE
WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IDAHO COMMUNITIES: DISCUSSION
DRAFT V 1.0 12–13 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2845046
[hereinafter WUI WILDFIRE P LANNING GUIDE]. The guide was edited and re-published to
embrace a wider audience of Western cities. See Stephen R. Miller, Planning for Wildfire at
the Wildland-Urban Interface: A Guide for Western Cities, 49 URB. LAW. 207 (2017). A
shorter version of the guide was also published. See Stephen R. Miller, Planning for Wildfire
at the Wildland-Urban Interface, 40(5) ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 1 (2017).

633

634

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

centers increasingly into areas that once burned with little or no concern for
loss of life or property.2 As suppression costs for wildfire have soared, a new
emphasis on planning for wildfire in this wildland-urban interface (WUI,
pronounced “WOO-ee”) has taken on a new strategic importance.
One goal of this article is to introduce a basic structure for engaging
wildfire planning in WUI communities. Another, and perhaps more farreaching, goal of this article is to argue for the importance of utilizing
informal governance structures in disaster planning, especially in the smaller
rural communities that often still predominate at the edge of urban areas. In
such rural communities, informal governance structures can often have a
significant role to play in whether disaster planning is successful, often more
than the formalized legal codes of the local government.
To frame this argument, the article proceeds in the following manner.
Section II describes the underlying project, which focuses on increasing
capacity for wildfire planning in the WUI of Idaho, on which this article
relies.3 Section III briefly describes the crisis of wildfire in the WUI as
development, especially in the West, encroaches further into wildlands and
wilderness.4 Section IV describes the WUI wildfire planning process the
authors have previously presented in both written and oral presentations.5
This process offers a conceptual framework for wildfire planning that
emphasizes community engagement, the creation of regulatory and nonregulatory tools that reflect the local community’s values, implementation
and enforcement strategies, and a re-assessment period that would begin the
cycle anew. While this framework is consistent with current wildfire
planning strategies, this article seeks to investigate and propose another
layer of engagement: the informal governance structures of rural
communities. Section V does this by illustrating how informal governance
structures can provide the missing link in disaster planning for rural
communities.6 In Section VI, the authors illustrate how local government in
local communities can, in many cases, appear to have all the trappings of
traditional large-scale government apparatuses.7 However, upon closer
investigation, these rural local governments often struggle for relevance. In
some cases, their planning and building codes are not enforced, judicial
resources can be scarce for enforcement of civil matters, training of
planning staff and commissioners is often non-existent, codes in rural
2. The risk perception study was overseen by Professor Eric Lindquist. The study was
initially begun by Professor Thomas Wuerzer, Associate Professor for Real Estate
Development, Nova Southeastern University, while previously at Boise State University.
3. See infra Section II.
4. See infra Section III.
5. See infra Section IV.
6. See infra Section V.
7. See infra Section VI.
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communities are often boilerplate and not tailored to local communities, and
emergency response equipment is often a shell of what would be expected in
an urban environment. The importance of these observations is not to
diminish the governmental efforts of rural communities; rather, they
illustrate the complicated mechanisms of local government that are
challenging for small and resource-strapped locales to implement. Further,
this section seeks to use sociological research to explore how rural
communities can utilize informal governance structures in place of, and in
support of, formalized local government. In Section VII, the article
encourages agencies engaging in disaster planning to find ways to quickly
evaluate and engage informal governance structures in rural communities.8
One approach would be to adopt something like the participatory rural
assessment (PRA) technique for evaluating informal governance structures
in developing countries. In Section VIII, the article returns to the importance
of formal local government, even for those communities that culturally
prefer informal local governance structures.9 Codes unattended can become
weapons of development projects the community does not want, which can
be problematic for disaster planning generally, and especially in the case of
wildfire.
II. ABOUT THE PROJECT
In June 2015, the U.S. Forest Service and the Idaho Department of
Lands provided a grant to scholars at the University of Idaho and Boise
State University, who are also the authors of this article, to address planning
for WUI wildfires throughout Idaho’s varied terrain and communities.10 In
the first phase of the project, law students in the Economic Development
Clinic11 at the University of Idaho College of Law’s Boise campus contacted
all 200 Idaho cities and forty-four Idaho counties to determine the status of
existing wildfire regulations and incentives. In addition, the Clinic collected

8. See infra Section VII.
9. See infra Section VIII.
10. Letter from Tyre Holfeltz, Cmty. Fire and Program Manager, Idaho Dep’t of Lands,
to Stephen R. Miller, Professor of Law & Assoc. Dean for Faculty Dev., Univ. of Idaho Coll.
of Law (June 2, 2015) (on file with author). Thereafter, the Grant was referenced as: IDL
Reference: Grant No./Task Order No.: 16-303. Funds for the Grant were provided by the U.S.
Forest Service’s Landscape Scale Restoration Grant program.
11. Economic Development Clinic, UNIV. OF IDAHO COLL. OF LAW, http://www.uidaho
.edu/law/academics/practical-skills/clinics/econ-dev (last visited Aug. 6, 2018). The
Economic Development Clinic is directed by Professor Stephen R. Miller. Two students in
the clinic, Brian Stephens and Alexander Grad, provided especially valuable research for the
project.
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and reviewed all forty-four of Idaho’s counties’ wildfire protection plans,12
which were generally written between 2003 and 2007, as well as updates to
those plans currently underway in several counties.13
At the same time, Boise State University’s Public Policy Research
Center14 conducted a risk perception study to understand how Idahoans
relate to wildfire risk.15 In subsequent years of the grant, the University of
Idaho’s Bioregional Planning and Community Design program16 has joined
the effort and is in the process of coordinating workshops around the State
to assist local communities to formulate locally appropriate approaches to
planning for wildfire in the WUI. By the end of the project, the team hopes
to be able to formulate an outreach strategy that will allow state and federal
agencies to successfully work with communities throughout Idaho on
mitigation for wildfire.
III. WILDFIRE IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE (WUI)
The importance of wildfire planning has become evident as the cost of
wildfire suppression continues to skyrocket. In 1995, fire made up 16% of
the U.S. Forest Service’s annual appropriation budget; in 2015, wildfire
consumed more than 50% percent of the agency’s budget, a benchmark
reflective of steadily rising costs.17 A recent study of wildfires in Wyoming
found that protecting just one isolated home can add $225,000 to the overall
cost of fighting a fire.18 The price of fire is also told in lost recreational
opportunities, scarred landscapes adjacent to city centers, loss of wildlife
12. Idaho has largely used the term “county wildfire protection plan” rather than
“community wildfire protection plan” even though those plans fulfill requirements of federal
community wildfire protection plan statutes. STATE OF IDAHO, IDAHO STATEWIDE
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY FOR THE NATIONAL FIRE PLAN 1 (2006), http://idahofirewise
.org/assets/library/National%20Fire%20Plan%20and%20Idaho%20Strategy/General/id%20n
at%20fire%20plan%20implementation.pdf [hereinafter IDAHO FIRE PLAN].
13. Referenced county wildfire protection plans on file with Professor Stephen R.
Miller. See also WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 21–33.
14. Wuerzer, supra note 2.
15. WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 14–17.
16. This effort is led by Professor Jaap Vos.
17. U.S. FOREST SERV., THE RISING COST OF WILDFIRE OPERATIONS: EFFECTS ON THE
FOREST SERVICE’S NON-FIRE WORK 2 (2015), http://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/2015Fire-Budget-Report.pdf. In 2018, the financing of wildfire suppression was changed
beginning with fiscal year 2020. While this will relieve the Forest Service’s budgetary
concerns, it does not lessen the extraordinary escalation in such costs. By fiscal year 2027,
the federal government plans to appropriate $2.97 billion in funds annually for wildfire
suppression. See Cost of Operations, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/aboutagency/budget-performance/cost-fire-operations (last visited June 7, 2018).
18. ANNA M. SCOFIELD ET AL., RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS ON FIREFIGHTING
COSTS IN THE WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE 3 (2015), http://wyoextension.org/agpubs/pubs
/B-1268.pdf.
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habitat, presence of invasive species, and increasingly, secondary aftereffects such as flood and landslides, that can cause even greater long-term
harm to a community than the initial fire.19
Wildfires occur in a variety of terrain, fuels, and weather, but this
article focuses on those wildfires in the WUI. The WUI is both a
sociological and legal term that is fluid based upon context; however, a
common definition is that the WUI is where “humans and their development
meet or intermix with wildland fuel.”20 In 2006, the Forest Service adopted a
similar policy definition, which states that “[t]he WUI is the area where
structures and other human development meet or intermingle with
undeveloped wildland.”21
Although fewer wildfires occur in the WUI compared to timberlands or
rangelands, they are of increasing concern for several reasons. First, WUI
fires are expensive to fight. Six of the ten most expensive fires in the past
100 years were WUI fires.22 Further, the WUI is relatively undeveloped. By
one account, just fourteen percent of the WUI is developed, leaving a vast
potential region of growth that, if developed without wildfire in mind, could
yield staggering costs as the West continues to grow.23 Finding ways to
prevent “locking in” long-term, high-cost development patterns, while still
encouraging such development and growth, is a threshold issue facing
Western communities’ property owners, taxpayers, and governments.
IV. THE WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING PROCESS
In September 2016, the authors produced the first major report of the
project, which was a guide to planning for wildfire in the wildland-urban
interface.24 That report, Planning for Wildfire in the Wildland-Urban
Interface: A Resource Guide for Idaho Communities (“WUI Wildfire
Planning Guide” or “Guide”), utilized existing best practices gleaned from
research, as well as numerous conversations with leading wildfire planning
experts across the country and with local members of the community. The
19. See, e.g., URBAN DRAINAGE FLOOD CONTROL DIST., A SEPTEMBER TO REMEMBER:
THE 2013 COLORADO FLOOD WITHIN THE URBAN DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT
(2014) (describing after effects of wildfire on Colorado communities).
20. Urban Wildland Interface Communities within the Vicinity of Federal Lands That
Are at High Risk from Wildfire, 66 Fed. Reg. 752,753 (2001).
21. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.D.A., AUDIT REPORT: FOREST SERVICE LARGE FIRE
SUPPRESSION COSTS, at i n.1 (2006), http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/08601-44-SF.pdf.
22. ROSS GORTE, THE RISING COST OF WILDFIRE PROTECTION 1 (2013), http://headwaters
economics.org/wphw/wp-content/uploads/fire-costs-background-report.pdf.
23. HEADWATERS ECON., SOLUTIONS TO THE RISING COSTS OF FIGHTING FIRES IN THE
WILDLAND URBAN INTERFACE 5, 11 (2009), http://headwaterseconomics.org/wphw/wpcontent/uploads/HeadwatersFireCosts.pdf.
24. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 7.
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WUI Wildfire Planning Guide is considered a “discussion draft” that could
be amended as it was presented to, and reaction was received from,
communities across the state subject to high wildfire risks. The approach
presented in the Guide was a process that, while in line with the general
scope of wildfire planning literature, was a new means of organizing
complex material in a manner intended to make it easier for rural
communities with fewer resources to actively participate in the wildfire
planning process.25
The amount of science and technology dedicated to addressing wildfire
in the WUI issues is substantial: decades of research provide a rich array of
knowledge about fire from which to draw. The missing piece of the puzzle
is the planning and legal framework that would apply that knowledge to
protect property and lives from fire. The Guide sought to use planning, law,
and incentives to implement what is already known about wildfire and keep
communities safe.
The Guide’s primary contribution was a conceptual framework that
local communities—governmental and non-governmental—could use over
time. The framework, which the Guide calls the “WUI Wildfire Planning
Process,” consists primarily of a four-step, cyclical planning process that
revolves around the inter-governmental National Cohesive Strategy Vision
and Goals for wildfire, and is supported at all times by education and
outreach.26
Although little known outside of the fire community, the National
Cohesive Strategy Goals are simple, but important, goals established
through a five-year planning process (2009 to 2014) in which federal
agencies, state, tribal, and local governments, as well as non-governmental
partners, built a common vision of how the country could address wildfire.27
The three goals of the Cohesive Strategy are maintaining landscapes,
developing fire-adapted communities, and developing a multi-jurisdictional
wildfire response based upon risk-based decision making.28 These Cohesive
Strategy Goals are the core around which the WUI Wildfire Planning
Process revolves.
The four active steps of the WUI Wildfire Planning Process are
illustrated below.29 The steps are (1) draft and adopt a community wildfire
protection plan (CWPP); (2) regulate and incentivize the built environment
25. Id.
26. Id. at 23.
27. U.S.D.A., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY: THE FINAL PHASE IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 1
(2014),
https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/strategy/thestrategy.shtml
[hereinafter
NATIONAL COHESIVE STRATEGY].
28. Id. at 3.
29. See Figure 1.
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at all scales; (3) implement, maintain and enforce regulations and incentives;
and (4) respond to substantial changes such as wildfires or the passage of
time.30

Figure 1. The WUI Wildfire Planning Process
CWPPs are an excellent place to begin wildfire planning for several
reasons. A creature of federal law, CWPPs actually permit local
communities to have a say in how wildfire on federal lands is maintained,
which is a major concern for many Idaho, and many Western,
communities.31 Further, CWPPs make communities eligible for federal
funding opportunities; such opportunities will grow as CWPPs are
increasingly integrated into county All Hazard Mitigation Plans and, if
properly updated every five years, will make wildfire hazards eligible for
even more funds.32 CWPPs are also important because they provide a
30. WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 9.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 6511(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–206) (defining “at
risk community” for purposes of CWPPs broadly).
32. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 10.
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framework for identifying wildfire risk at an ecological scale that permits
local communities to think beyond their jurisdictional boundaries, precisely
because the process includes federal, state, tribal, and local government and
non-governmental participants.
For example, one of the limiting factors in the success of CWPPs in
Idaho in the past has been that they have been conducted solely at the
county level and by a select group of fire community individuals.33 While
county CWPPs are clearly still valuable, Idaho Department of Lands sought
to encourage the preparation of CWPPs at multiple scales, as contemplated
by federal law and practiced in other Western states.34 For instance, a
county-wide CWPP may be supplemented by a city CWPP and even a
neighborhood CWPP conducted by a homeowner’s association that has a
particular wildfire hazard, as is well-illustrated by the nested CWPPs of
Boulder County, Colorado.35 Each scale permits a different level of
preparedness and analysis that is valuable. CWPPs could also be more
valuable by increasing the scope of participation to include others that will
facilitate wildfire decisions in other parts of the process.36 This would mean
including local officials, local staff, and a proposed citizens’ advisory board,
in addition to the traditional fire staff, in the CWPP process.37
The second step in the process is for a local jurisdiction—a city or
county—to decide on the package of regulations and incentives it will utilize
to address the identified wildfire risk.38 Doing so requires local governments
to decide whether to allow development in areas of high wildfire risk and, if
they do so, to decide how to respond with local values related to regulatory
versus incentive-based approaches and the successes of each in relation to
the risk.39 The Guide discusses several approaches that have worked well in
other communities, which include seeking co-benefits, such as open space,
that may matter locally; seizing upon interest that often arises after a
wildfire; choosing an approach that the community can support; and
anticipating for wildfire’s after-effects, especially flood, landslide, aesthetic
harm, and economic development issues.40

33. IDAHO FIRE PLAN, supra note 12, at 2.
34. See, e.g., Wildfire, PLANNING FOR HAZARDS: LAND USE SOLS. FOR COLO. https://
www.planningforhazards.com/wildfire (last visited Oct. 28, 2018).
35. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 34–35; see also BOULDER
CTY., COLO., BOULDER COUNTY COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PLAN (2011), https://assets.boulder
county.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/community-wildfire-protection-plan-book-lowres.pdf.
36. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 29–31.
37. Id.
38. See generally id. at 36–53.
39. Id. at 36–37.
40. Id.
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There is no one-size-fits-all approach to wildfire.41 For some
communities, a simple approach could be to focus on the basics: defensible
space, metal roofs, and weed ordinances to reduce fuels.42 This simple,
effective solution can work very well in rural areas. More urban areas will
likely want a solution that fits the complexity of the built environment.
Regulatory tools are discussed at the community scale, such as
comprehensive plans, specific plans, and land use zoning overlay districts;
the neighborhood and subdivision scale; the individual site or project scale;
and the building scale.43 Non-regulatory tools are equally important and can
supplement regulatory tools, or stand-alone.44 They include the popular
Firewise program,45 which is a valuable educational tool but which often
yields uncertain results; insurance, which has a role to play in pricing fire
risk;46 and homeowner’s associations, which have served as a vehicle for
local communities to provide enhanced wildfire security for their
community independent of government regulation.47
Once regulations and incentives have been adopted, they must be
applied to specific projects and enforced over time; similarly, incentive
programs must be implemented and examined to determine efficacy.48 This
third step may be the most important—it is where ideas yield results—but it
is also an especially hard step for wildfire. That is because many of the
factors associated with wildfire risk reduction require maintenance—of
buildings, of landscaping, of cleanliness near structures—that collides with
the entitlement-driven development process that prioritizes one-time, upfront conditions of approval.49 This section of the Guide begins by
discussing the importance of communication between local government
departments to address precisely this issue.50 The section then turns to the
types of enforcement mechanisms that are being tried by some Idaho
41. Id.
42. WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 37–38; see also Defensible Space,
IDAHO FIREWISE (Apr. 6, 2017), http://idahofirewise.org/2017/04/06/creating-defensiblespace-can-save-your-home/.
43. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, COMMUNITY WILDFIRE SAFETY THROUGH REGULATION: A
BEST PRACTICES GUIDE FOR PLANNERS AND REGULATORS 23–24 (2013), https://www.nfpa
.org/-/media/Files/PublicEducation/Bytopic/Wildland/WildfireBestPracticesGuide.ashx?
la=en [hereinafter NFPA GUIDE].
44. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 48–54.
45. Firewise USA: Residents Reducing Wildfire Risks, NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, http://
firewise.org/usa-recognition-program.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).
46. See Does Insurance Affect Home Development on Wildfire-Prone Lands?,
HEADWATERS ECONS. (June 2016), http://headwaterseconomics.org/wildfire/solutions/
insurance-wildfire-home-development; WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 51.
47. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 51–54.
48. See id. at 54–59.
49. See id. at 10.
50. See id. at 55–56.
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communities, but also communities throughout the West.51 These include
homeowner’s association covenants, conditions, and restrictions that make
local governments the third-party beneficiaries of wildfire-related
maintenance agreements;52 using the development agreement process to plan
for wildfire upfront;53 using zoning to require maintenance;54 as well as retooling nuisance ordinances to address wildfire.55 The section also discusses
some non-enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure techniques that
prioritize informing property owners of the wildfire risk on their lands, and
how to mitigate it.56 Other approaches include cities that conduct wildfire
fuel reduction work for private property owners so long as they sign a
maintenance agreement for on-going upkeep of the mitigation.57
The fourth, and final step in the process occurs when there is a
substantial event, such as a wildfire, or even a secondary effect like a flood
or landslide, that causes the local community to realize that it needs to reevaluate, and re-visit its wildfire planning strategy.58 In addition to such an
event, the passage of time becomes its own reason to revisit a wildfire
planning strategy, if only because WUI demographics change quickly; an
exurban community one year could be a bona fide bedroom community in a
decade.59 In addition, as Idaho and other states move to integrate CWPPs
into All Hazard Mitigation Plans (AHMP), the CWPPs will need to be
reviewed every year and revised every five years for compliance with
AHMP regulations.60 The combination of wildfire events and the passage of
time give local communities a number of reasons to revisit their approaches
to planning, determine what has worked and what has faltered, and create an
amended plan going forward.

51. See id. at 10.
52. See id. at 56–57; see also GREATER LAGUNA COAST FIRE SAFETY COUNCIL, LAGUNA
BEACH COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PROTECTION PLAN AND OTHER NATURAL DISASTERS § 1.1.4.5,
http://www.lagunacoastfiresafecouncil.org/images/Written%20Plan%2003-05-07.pdf.
53. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 57–58; see also CAL.
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF P LANNING & RESEARCH, FIRE HAZARD PLANNING: GENERAL P LAN
TECHNICAL ADVICE SERIES 49–50 (Apr. 2014), https://www.opr.ca.gov/docs/Fire_Hazard
_Planning_Public_Review_Draft_June_24_2014.pdf.
54. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 58–59; see also COEUR
D’ALENE, IDAHO, DEV. CODE § 17.08.950 (2016).
55. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 59–60; see also SISTERS, OR.,
Ord. No. 444 (2014), https://www.codepublishing.com/OR/Sisters/html/ords/Ord444.pdf.
56. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 60; see also Interactive GIS
Map, MCCALL, IDAHO tinyurl.com/mccallfirewise (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).
57. See WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 60; Firesmart, KOOTENAI
CTY., IDAHO, https://www.kcsheriff.com/190/FireSmart (last visited October 23, 2018).
58. WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 60–61.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Although a community’s planning process may not follow this
conceptual framework precisely, the WUI Wildfire Planning Process
provides a way to contemplate how to use all of the tools available to
maximize wildfire preparedness. Along the way, education remains a vital
component of wildfire planning, both to communicate the nature of wildfire
risk but also what it means to be prepared to face that risk.61
V. THE MISSING LINK IN DISASTER PLANNING: INFORMAL GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURES
Outreach for the Grant is on-going; however, the authors continue to
believe that the approach outlined in WUI WILDFIRE GUIDE, described
briefly in the previous section, captured a viable and important framework
for WUI wildfire planning. Concerns raised thus far about the proposed
process are primarily as follows: (1) overcoming inter- and intragovernmental barriers is difficult; (2) ownership of the process is
complicated because the scope of proposed actions is cast between different
agencies and different departments; and (3) the approach provided required
significant time commitment by non-fire employees and non-fire residents
to come up to speed and engage in the process, which is hard to achieve.62
All of these were expected criticisms of the Guide’s approach, which
specifically sought to challenge many of the institutional barriers that carve
up decision making in the wildfire planning arena. However, in the course
of presentations, the authors came to realize a missing link in the process: a
nuanced engagement of informal governance structures.
The authors argue that, in many rural communities, the primary
problem in establishing a disaster planning process is not presented by the
typical inter- and intra-governmental problems that occur in almost any
governmental program. The primary problem, instead, is that many rural
communities are not governed in any meaningful way by government at any
level. That does not mean these communities are lawless. Instead of the
formalized mechanisms of government, which many rural communities
reject, these places instead rely upon an alternative governance structure that
maintains order and responds to local concerns in an informal manner that
nonetheless reflects an ordering commensurate with a governance structure.
These informal governance structures are often highly localized and
knowing about the governance of one local community does not ensure
understanding of other rural communities’ approaches to governance.
61. Id.
62. This list of concerns is based upon responses received in over a dozen presentations
by the authors presenting the WUI WILDFIRE GUIDE to various groups including academics,
planners, fire department officials, building code officials, and local government elected
officials.
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Informal governance in rural communities has significant implications
for how federal, state, and local efforts to approach and manage disaster
planning should be done. In the WUI Wildfire Guide, the authors made
every effort to offer solutions for how non-governmental community actors
could engage in the CWPP process, as well as how non-regulatory tools and
incentive-based processes could be used in the creation of policies (Step 2),
as well as their implementation and enforcement (Step 3). However, these
structures ultimately depend upon a government entity—or, perhaps, a
quasi-governmental entity such as a homeowner’s association—to take
control in the implementation and enforcement phase. When the government
entities in rural communities fail to take these steps of policy creation,
implementation, and enforcement, this can lead to the exasperating
conclusion that rural communities are either uninterested in planning for
disaster, or so intransigently opposed to the governmental forces that could
help them that future efforts for assistance can seem futile.
The authors, however, seek to argue for an alternative approach. While
the WUI Wildfire Guide still provides the best framework for working
within the existing legal structures, the authors suggest that disaster planning
should evaluate how to better engage the informal governance structures
that predominate in rural communities. This is no small thing. Such informal
governance often has no direct financial accountability, the structure of its
leadership is typically unelected, and enforcement of local norms has
nothing to do with due process.
A good example of informal governance can be found in Idaho City, a
community that one of the authors has now worked with for several years.
In Idaho City, the local Chamber of Commerce plays an important role in
governance. In this small town with about 400 residents, the Chamber has
approximately seventy paying members and it is very active.63 The Chamber
is led by a group of women and men that own a variety of businesses in
town, most of which are dependent on tourism. 64 Many of these business
owners, however, are not residents of Idaho City and either live outside of
town or in one of the communities nearby. The former president of the
Chamber, now the vice president, and her husband own two businesses in
downtown Idaho City, but she lives in Centerville, a small town about ten
miles north of Idaho City. In addition, their businesses close around
Thanksgiving for the winter and do not reopen until Mother’s Day weekend.
During this winter break, she travels around the globe. During her
presidency, that meant the Chamber was effectively without its president,
63. Chamber Members, IDAHO CITY CHAMBER COM., https://www.idahocitychamber
.org/businesses.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).
64. Id. According to Idaho City Chamber of Commerce’s membership list, more than
one third of all members are directly dependent on tourism for their income.

2018]

GOVERNANCE AND DISASTER PLANNING

645

and now still without its vice-president and important voice. In addition, the
CuMo Mine is a member of the Chamber and the Chamber actively supports
the CuMo mining project, as it supports all its members.65 Meanwhile, the
opening of this mine (about twelve miles North of Idaho City) will have
major impacts on Idaho City, including potential positive impacts on the
local economy but also a potential strain on the already limited
infrastructure and services in town.
Without recognizing and fully engaging the informal governance that
predominates in rural communities, governmental efforts will likely fail to
achieve any significant changes to disaster planning, or any other
meaningful governmental objective, without investigating and relating to the
community’s informal means of governance.
VI. GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE IN RURAL COMMUNITIES
From afar, rural communities—whether legally cities, towns, or
hamlets—can look like they are simply smaller versions of larger cities.
Indeed, they often have many of the same formalities of government as large
cities. In some states, these formalities are graduated by city size with
additional responsibilities—and powers—granted to larger cities.66 Even in
those states, however, rural local governments almost always have some
kind of elected decision-making body, such as a city council, as well as
fundamental powers to determine how land and development in their
community will occur.67
In Idaho, where the authors conducted their research, there is no
gradation of local governments by size. The same legal powers and
responsibilities that apply to Boise, the State’s capital with a population of
226,000, also apply to all other 199 cities in the state even though 118 of the
200 Idaho cities have a population fewer than 1,000 persons and 167 of the
200 Idaho cities have a population fewer than 5,000 persons.68 The result is
that local government laws meant to require cities to plan for explosive
growth, such as extensive comprehensive planning, makes sense for Boise
and its chief suburb, Meridian, which are routinely listed by the Census as
65. Personal communication with Lisa Hanson, Vice President of the Idaho City
Chamber of Commerce.
66. See generally 1 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 2:43 (3d ed. 2007) (“Cities are divided by
statute in some states into cities of the first class, cities of the second class, and so on,
according to population, and separate chapters of the statutes govern such cities differently to
some extent according to such classification.”).
67. See generally 2A MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. §§ 10:1–10:51 (3d ed. 2007) (describing
construction and execution of powers in local governments).
68. Idaho 2017 City Census Tables, IDAHO DEPT. LABOR, https://lmi.idaho.gov/census
(last updated May 24, 2018).
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among the fastest-growing cities in the country.69 On the other hand, such
planning provisions make less sense for many of Idaho’s rural communities
that are losing population or where growth is more modest.70 The result in
Idaho, and likely in many other states, is that the laws for local governments
are written primarily to fit—and circumscribe—the powers of the largest
cities.71
Federal and state programs that seek to interface with rural
communities prioritize the local rural government for obvious reasons:
governments seek to work with other governments that have similar powers
and abilities to enforce provisions where there is mutual agreement on goals
and objectives.72 Governments also prefer working with other governments
because of accountability and a structure of departments that make
intergovernmental conversations easier and, often, more effective and
efficient.73
The problem is that local governments in rural areas often do not have
the capacity—staff, planning and legal knowledge, and financing, among
other concerns—to live up to the expectations of other governments seeking
partners in large-scale projects such as disaster planning.74 The following are
several examples of ways in which local governments’ administrative
structures obscure the actual ability to achieve stated objectives in disaster
planning.
A.

Non-Enforcement of Planning and Building Codes at the
Administrative Level

In many rural communities, the planning apparatus appears similar to
that of larger cities. For instance, in Idaho, every city has a mandatory
comprehensive plan, there is almost always zoning, and there are building
69. Nicole Blanchard, Idaho Officially Earns the Title of Nation’s Fastest Growing
State, Census Bureau Says, IDAHO STATESMAN (Dec. 21, 2017, 9:12 AM), https://www
.idahostatesman.com/news/local/article190738949.html.
70. Steve Bertel, Census Report: Idaho’s Rural-to-Urban Shift Continues; Larger
Counties
Still
Growing,
KIVTV
(Mar.
22,
2018,
12:46
PM),
https://www.kivitv.com/news/census-report-idahos-rural-to-urban-shift-continues-largercounties-still-growing.
71. This issue extends to the planning profession and planning tools, which treat rural
places either as cities or as places that still have to become cities, see for instance “citation.”
72. 1 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 3A:5 (3d ed. 2007) (“The point seems inescapable that
the taxpayers, citizens, and the state as a whole would be better served if local governments
would substitute cooperation.”).
73. 1 MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 3A:11 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing procedures of
intergovernmental cooperation).
74. Admittedly, many larger cities also fall short in their own planning efforts; however,
the goal here is to focus on those problems that rural communities face and, as such, urban
issues will not be discussed here.
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codes.75 However, in many rural communities, those planning and building
codes are never, or selectively enforced.76
One building code inspector for Teton County, Idaho, a rural eastern
Idaho county with a population around 10,000, reported that he knew of
several building and planning code violations.77 The county code required
that the misdemeanor notice be served in person.78 However, the sheriff’s
office was too busy to do it, or unwilling, and the building code inspector
feared for his personal safety because the person committing the violation
was known for violence.79
The planning and building department director of Horseshoe Bend,
Idaho, was the only staff member who also served as the city clerk.
Horseshoe Bend is a rural Idaho city with a population of approximately 700
persons in the foothills north of Boise.80 The director reported that she
enforced no planning or building code provisions, except for fences because
that was the only thing about which the city received complaints.81
A different issue with enforcement has to do with the social fabric of
small communities. Since people typically know each other intimately,
minor violations are typically tolerated as long as people behave as
responsible neighbors. The authors ran into an interesting case of this in
Lapwai, Idaho, where the city decided not to take any action against a badly
damaged building.82 The damage was done by a fire in which the brother of
the current resident lost his life. Although the building should have been
demolished after the fire, nobody wanted to add to the loss that the owner
75. IDAHO CODE § 67-6508 (2018) (“It shall be the duty of the planning or planning and
zoning commission to conduct a comprehensive planning process designed to prepare,
implement, and review and update a comprehensive plan, hereafter referred to as the plan.”);
IDAHO CODE § 67-6511 (2018) (“Each governing board shall, by ordinance . . . establish
within its jurisdiction one (1) or more zones or zoning districts where appropriate. . . .”); see
also Idaho Division of Building Safety, IDAPA Administrative Rules, IDAHO OFF. OF THE
ADMIN. RULES COORDINATOR, https://adminrules.idaho.gov/rules/current/07/index.html (state
rules governing private construction).
76. In the 2011–12 and 2012–13 academic years, Professor Stephen R. Miller’s
Economic Development Clinic worked with officials in the Teton County, Idaho local
government. The discussion of Teton County here is based upon these two years of
experience working in this community.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Idaho 2017 City Census Tables, supra note 68.
81. In the 2016–17 academic year, Professor Stephen R. Miller’s Economic
Development Clinic worked with officials in the Horseshoe Bend, Idaho local government
during the spring semester. The discussion of Horseshoe Bend is based upon this experience
working in the community.
82. There is no record of this “decision” since it was decided during informal
discussions outside city hall.
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had faced in losing his brother in the fire, and so they permitted the burned
building to remain despite legal requirements to tear it down.83
B.

Rural Local Governments Often Have Few Resources for Enforcing
Civil Violations

In Teton County, Idaho, local government officials reported that even
when misdemeanor charges were filed for violating the county planning or
building codes, they still had trouble enforcing the charges.84 The county
judicial system consisted of a sole judge who held court only several days a
month.85 The judge prioritized criminal and domestic violence charges. If
there was not time to hear the civil matters, the judge would dismiss them.86
Further, Idaho has no statutory means of enabling administrative
enforcement of planning or building codes. While such administrative
enforcement is arguably legal in the state and utilized by some larger, urban
cities like Boise, the legal uncertainty in this Dillon’s Rule state causes
smaller rural communities to shy away from administrative enforcement by
notice of violation.87 As such, legal uncertainty keeps rural communities
from utilizing a method of enforcement that would be cheaper and less
reliant on the whims of judicial resources.
C.

There is Almost no Training of Planning and Building Staff or
Commissions.

Rural states, and rural cities in particular, have few resources to train
and maintain talented local officials. For instance, Idaho is one of the few
states that has no statewide planning office. For states that do have such aid,
such as Colorado’s Department of Local Affairs and California’s Office of
Planning and Research, these state agencies provide a much-needed
resource for basic planning guidance. In addition, planning and building
staff often do not have formal experience or training in development. For
instance, the planning director in Horseshoe Bend reported that prior to
taking her position, she had worked as a clerk at a gas station in town and
previously had no experience in the planning world.88 In Idaho City, the city
83. Interview with Ruth McConville, Mayor of Lapwai, Idaho (July 2017).
84. See supra note 76.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Idaho Code § 31-714 (2005) (limiting enforcement options to “such fines or
penalties, including infraction penalties, as the board may deem proper”). But see Idaho
Constitution, Article XII, § 2 (granting police power, which arguably provides grant of power
sufficient to enforce administrative remedy).
88. See supra note 81.
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clerk was not aware that the city had a comprehensive plan and only became
aware of the plan after the authors asked for it.89
Even in Boise, members of the planning and zoning commission,
which oversee development in the fastest-growing city in the nation, receive
no training in the city planning code, have almost no engagement with city
council, and are encouraged to simply approve the projects with conditions
as defined by staff.90
D.

Codes and Plans Are Often Antiquated Boilerplate

A review of codes in rural local governments often uncovers an
uncanny similarity: they are typically boilerplate versions shopped from
town to town by some consultant or lawyer who made a living providing
rural communities the most basic provisions of a code that complied with
state enabling statutes.91 The cookie-cutter approach works as well here as it
does anywhere, which is to say it often means local rural communities have
city codes that do not reflect the rural local government’s legal needs and do
not embody strategic foresight about the rural local governments challenges.
E.

Emergency Equipment is Often Less-Equipped than Appears

Emergency planning in rural communities is often direr than it might
initially appear. For instance, the city of New Meadows, Idaho, with a
population of around 500 has a fire department with an ambulance. 92
However, that ambulance is staffed entirely by volunteers, almost all of
whom are older men.93 There is limited technical ability offered on the
ambulance, which renders it primarily a shuttle service to a nearby hospital
in the neighboring city of McCall.94
These anecdotes are intended to provide illustrative examples of how
rural communities struggle to fulfill the legal formalities of government that
89. Since 2016, Professor Jaap Vos has been working with the Idaho City, Idaho local
government officials. The discussion of Idaho City is based upon this experience working in
this community.
90. Professor Stephen R. Miller, one of the authors, served on the Boise Planning and
Zoning Commission for several years. See also 1 Am. Law. Zoning § 4:8 (5th ed. 2008)
(discussing the few states with required training for planning and zoning board members).
91. The boilerplate language found in many rural Idaho city codes is evident by
comparing the codes’ language. Codes by Municipality, STERLING CODIFIERS,
http://sterlingcodifiers .com (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
92. In the 2014–15 academic year, Professor Stephen R. Miller’s Economic
Development Clinic worked with the New Meadows local government officials. The
discussion of New Meadows is based upon that experience.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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are often attuned to the expectations of urban dwellers. That does not mean,
however, that rural communities operate without rules or that they are
lawless places. Indeed, in many cases, there are informal institutions that
provide a means by which the community solves its problems and works
together to maintain its way of life. In fact, in some cases, keeping the local
government weak can be a purposeful strategy for preserving a rural way of
life that is unique to that city.
A study by the sociologists Jon C. Allen and Don A. Dillman is of
particular note in understanding this phenomenon. Allen and Dillman spent
considerable time in the 1980s and 1990s living in and studying the small
town of Bremer, Washington.95 At the time, Bremer had a population of 500
persons in the incorporated city and a total population of 1,000 persons
including those scattered in surrounding areas.96 In their study, an important
chapter details the role of a local community club, which many in town
deemed “more important than government.”97 The Bremer Community
Club, once a gun club established after World War II, had developed over
the years into a place where locally important people met to talk about the
community’s ills. Allen and Dillman describe the club this way:
The organization and membership of the club is rather informal, yet the
decisions made in the small (24-by-36 foot) building have long-term and
far-reaching effects on the town and surrounding community of Bremer.
It is here that members who represent almost all groups within the
community, from retired farmers to business owners, meet to discuss,
outside legal constraints, the needs of the community. Here, more than
any other place, community issues are connected to one another and
directions are decided. Whereas the participants see themselves as a
social club, their ability to bring resources, human and economic, to bear
on community-wide problems makes them the most powerful group
within the community.98

The club’s meetings appear to be purely social, are informal, and are
limited to members, most of whom were male.99 Meanwhile, at city hall, a
public meeting of the city council and mayor address a tree cutting issue
with significant back-and-forth with a local resident.100 Allen and Dillman
note:

95. See generally JON C. ALLEN & DON A. DILLMAN, AGAINST ALL ODDS: RURAL
COMMUNITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1994).
96. Id. at xv.
97. Id. at 103.
98. Id. at 103–04.
99. Id. at 104–05.
100. Id. at 107.
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The manner in which the business of the tree cutting was handled reflects
the informal norms of Bremer. The community-control attribute of
talking informally to community members before a decision is made
follows a long tradition in Bremer. With the overlapping institutions
within the community it is necessary that decisions be made by
consensus within the community. This differs quite drastically from the
formal norms of mass society, where legal mandates would dictate how
tree cutting or other changes in the community would be handled.
Bremer’s political institution is working within the community-control
era.101

Even this formal process has its informal traditions: when the city
council meeting is over, the council members move to the local tavern/café
for coffee, which is a place where everyone knows they can go and continue
the debate about even formal business.102 The structure of both the
community club and the informality of even the city council’s access to the
community permit Bremer “to bypass many of the regulations placed on
small rural governments by larger bureaucracies.”103
Of course, to an outsider, such ways of doing business may well smack
of due process and equal protection violations, much less open meeting laws
and many other government regulations. Nonetheless, the informal structure
is important to the traditions of the community and, as such, the community
norms are more likely to be upheld than the formal regulations thought to
generate from outside the community.104
Similarly, sociology professors Cornelia Butler Flora and Jan L. Flora
have noted the importance of including informal governance structures in
decision-making along with those of a formalized local government:
Governance is particularly important in rural areas, where governments
are small, elected government officials serve part time with small
budgets, and few professional staff are available to find the necessary
information to make sound decisions or to implement decisions when
they are made.105

The authors also note:
Because of their limited resources, most rural governments find it
difficult to provide adequate levels of public services when acting on
their own. By mandating certain services, state and federal governments
can require that local resources be directed to services that may not be
101. ALLEN & DILLMAN, supra note 95, at 107.
102. Id. at 110.
103. Id. at 114.
104. Id. at 115–18.
105. CORNELIA B. FLORA & JAN L. FLORA, RURAL COMMUNITIES: LEGACY
340 (4th ed. 2013).
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needed. Multiple general-purpose and special-purpose governments can
lead to conflicted or fragmented responses to local community needs. Or
they can overcome the natural desire to protect turf to collaborate in
providing synergy and efficiency. Finally, most rural governments face
fiscal stress that arises from a limited tax base facing increased demand
for local services. Governance—widening decision making and
responsibility to multiple jurisdictions and including market and civil
society groups—can help rural governments provide services and
increase public involvement.106

A number of other studies of rural places offer similar analyses.107 In
our own work in Idaho City, we discovered that most major initiatives were
initiated and executed by the local Chamber of Commerce.108 We also found
that a long-time resident and local store owner effectively acted as the city’s
archivist using a wicker laundry basket that contained almost 40 years of
studies, reports, and minutes of meetings.109
VII. ENGAGING INFORMAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING
PROCESS
The WUI Wildfire Planning Guide provided a number of strategies for
engaging the community beyond local governments. For instance, in the
CWPP process, the WUI Wildfire Planning Guide sought to “engage public
and encourage public ownership of the WUI wildfire planning process.”110
This was not a new invention; indeed, guidance from both the State of

106. Id. at 357–358.
107. See, e.g., RYAN LIPCSEI ET AL., ECON. DEVELOPERS COUNCIL OF ONT., EVOLVING THE
COMPETITIVE EDGE: RURAL COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT (2015), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/
hubfs/316071/Resources/Article/RuralCommunityEngagement_Report.pdf; Arthur A. Steiner
& Jane Farmer, Engage, Participate, Empower: Modelling Power Transfer in Disadvantaged
Rural Communities, 36(1) ENVTL. & PLAN. C: POL. & SPACE 118 (2018); Jo Barraket,
Enabling Structures for Coordinated Action: Community Organizations, Social Capital, and
Rural Community Sustainability, in A DYNAMIC BALANCE: SOCIAL CAPITAL AND
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITY DEV. 71 (Ann Dale & Jenny Onyx eds., 2005); Richelle Winkler et
al., Social Landscapes of the Inter-Mountain West: A Comparison of ‘Old West’ and ‘New
West’ Communities, 72(3) RURAL SOC. 478 (2007); K.G. Ricketts & H. Ladewig, A Path
Analysis of Community Leadership within Viable Rural Communities in Florida, 4(2)
LEADERSHIP 137 (2008); Michael R. Cope et al., Making Sense of Community Action and
Voluntary Participation—A Multilevel Test of Multilevel Hypotheses: Do Communities Act?,
81(1) RURAL SOC. 3 (2016).
108. See supra note 89.
109. After the discovery of the basket, University of Idaho students scanned all the
materials and wrote summaries of each document. All these documents are now readily
available for residents in the local library.
110. WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 21.
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Idaho111 and the federal government112 has long encouraged broad
participation in CWPPs. This stems from the heart of the CWPP enabling
statute, which does not emphasize governmental actors, but
“communities.”113 In practice, however, the drafting of CWPPs has typically
fallen to local governments, and often specifically to fire departments within
city or county governments. The non-governmental participation, in all but a
few communities, has almost always been through homeowner’s
associations, Firewise-designated communities, or some other entity with a
quasi-governmental role. In the WUI Wildfire Guide, we proposed that
participation in CWPPs should consist of four groups: the fire group; the
local official group; the local staff group; and the citizen advisor group.114
What the Guide did not address, however, was the community issue we
have identified here: where local government is weak and alternative, local
governance holds sway. Failure to recognize or identify this structure has
important implications as disaster planning moves from the planning process
to the creation of regulatory and incentive-based programs and, especially,
the enforcement and maintenance of such provisions. If there is an
alternative local governance structure that is not identified and not embraced
from the beginning, the rest of the planning mechanism may result in a
hollow exercise. This is true even when the local government may
implement policies that, on the surface, appear to result in a meaningful
change in disaster planning. As identified previously, in many rural
communities, laws and regulations are not always enforced and incentives
that require onerous paperwork or other government-style interactions are
unlikely to garner much interest.
As a result, we suggest that, early in the planning stage for disaster
management, the entity responsible for the planning document, such as a fire
department for a CWPP, should engage in a process to map the local
governance and power structure.115 If that analysis determines that local
governance and power exists in some substantial manner outside of the local
government, the disaster planning process must seek to include that informal
governance mechanism in the planning process. Moreover, the goal should
111. IDAHO FIRE PLAN, supra note 12, at 5; See also WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE,
supra note 1, at 29–30 n.28.
112. FORESTS AND RANGELANDS, PREPARING A COMMUNITY WILDFIRE PROTECTION PLAN
5 (2004), https://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/documents/resources/communities/cwp
phandbook.pdf [hereinafter PREPARING A CWPP].
113. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 6513 (West 2016).
114. WUI WILDFIRE PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 1, at 30–31.
115. Based on our experiences in Idaho, initial identification of a general outline of these
governance and power systems is relatively easy but in order to really understand the
subtleties of how decisions are made and how things get done in a community, it is necessary
to be involved in a community for a longer period and gain the trust of the residents and local
leadership.

654

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

be to keep the informal governance mechanism engaged in disaster planning
through its entire cycle, such as that embodied by the WUI Wildfire
Planning Process.
This will likely not prove an easy task. Disaster planning, such as the
WUI Wildfire Planning Process, is based upon formalized processes of
baselines, definitions, and fact-based decision-making. Informal governance
often eschews these approaches, instead favoring relationships, personal
commitments, and a deep knowledge of the community—a feeling in the
gut. It can lead to amorphous goals that vary considerably in approach from
one rural place to another. However, our experience indicates that failure to
acknowledge and engage this alternative informal governance structure will
likely make any formal disaster planning by a local government almost
meaningless. A governmental disaster planning policy that does not have the
support of a locally prominent, informal governance structure will yield
smart policies on paper, but those policies will have little chance to be
implemented, enforced, or maintained.
Acknowledging the logistical challenge of rural informal governance
requires an acknowledgement that one of its most powerful forces is an
ability to thwart the intentions of distant governmental agencies, whether
state or federal. If those agencies want to work with rural communities,
those agencies must quickly identify whether the local government is the
source of power. Indeed, the presence of a non-governmental, local
governance structure does not forestall federal or state agency involvement.
Many federal and state agencies have worked successfully with informal
governance structures. This has perhaps been best identified in the academic
research on common pool resources.116
The dilemma, however, is identifying those informal governance
structures idiosyncratic to local communities when an agency is first
engaging and has no history with the place. There are approximately 39,000
local governments in the United States, and even more un-incorporated
communities.117 There is no easy, one-size-fits-all approach to engaging all
of these places. On the other hand, shrinking resources demand efficiency in
entering into and working with a community by agency personnel that does
not permit a prolonged period to engage and learn about the local
community.
To address this issue in the wildfire planning process, we suggest that
leaders of the process consider amending some of the rapid assessment tools
utilized by researchers and development officials seeking to understand the
116. See Michael Cox et al., A Review of Design Principles for Community-Based
Natural Resource Management, 15(4) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 38 (2010).
117. CARMA HOGUE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOV’T ORG. SUMMARY REPORT: 2012 at 1
(2013), https://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf.
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dynamics of rural communities in developing countries. While these rapid
assessment tools may need some amendment to the particular agency or
disaster planning mechanism, the underlying principles of rapid assessment
tools could prove valuable in quickly engaging informal governance
structures in rural American communities.
Perhaps chief among these tools, long used in the developing world, is
a participatory rural appraisal (PRA).118 The success of PRAs have spawned
a host of related community engagement mechanisms, such as participatory
action research utilized by research scholars119 and community-based
participatory research, which has become popular in the public health
community.120 This discussion will focus on PRAs, however, as the purpose
is to present a mechanism for engaging and evaluating the presence of
informal governance structures that can be utilized in a disaster planning
process.
PRAs have been defined as “a family of approaches and methods to
enable rural people to share, enhance, and analyze their knowledge of life
and conditions, to plan and to act.”121 The term PRA ultimately is more of an
approach and group of techniques that can, as one sociologist frames it, be
practiced “to enable local people to conduct their own analysis, and often to
plan and take action.”122
118. Robert Chambers, The Origins and Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal, 22(7)
WORLD DEV. 953, 953 (1994).
119. Id. at 954.
120. See STEVEN S. COUGHLIN, SELINA A. SMITH & MARIA E. FERNANDEZ, Overview of
Community-Based Participatory Research, in HANDBOOK OF COMMUNITY-BASED
PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH 2 (2017). Community-based participatory research, or CBPR, is
described in this manner:
Community-based participatory research is a collaborative approach to research
in which the research process is driven by an equitable partnership that is formed
between relevant community members, organizational representatives, and
academic researchers; the CBPR framework uses this partnership with the aim of
increasing the value of the research product for all partners. Community-based
participatory research takes advantage of the unique strengths and insights that
community and academic partners each bring to framing health problems and
developing solutions. Community members, organizational representatives, and
academic researchers participate in and share control over all phases of the
research process from assessment—discovering the community’s health needs—
to dissemination—developing strategies to increase the adoption,
implementation, and maintenance of evidence-based interventions (EBIs) in
communities and healthcare settings. Community-based participatory research
approaches facilitate and accelerate research translation so that research produces
pragmatic results capable of leading to positive and sustainable community
change.
Id.
121. Chambers, supra note 118, at 953.
122. Id. at 958.
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PRAs evolved in the late 1980s and 1990s out of the practice of rapid
rural appraisals, or RRAs, which were primarily used “for learning by
outsiders.”123 The PRA is not a prescribed method of local community
engagement; rather, it is more of a grab bag of approaches that can be
utilized by researchers or, in this case, potentially agency personnel, seeking
to learn about a local community.124 While there is no one single definition
of a PRA, an influential one presents three pillars of PRA: methods,
attitudes and behavior, and sharing.125 In all cases, the PRA is an approach
that seeks both to rapidly learn about the local community and also to find
ways to utilize the structure of that community to allow it to help itself.126 A
number of guides provide detailed approaches on how to use PRAs in
accordance with the different missions of charity and relief organizations, as
well as development organizations.127
While a detailed review of the PRA literature is beyond the scope of
this article, the PRA process, and its success, illustrates a ground-up process
that has shown success in learning about the informal governance structures
of rural communities in the developing world. While there are community
engagement tools aimed at rural communities in the United States, few, if
any, start from the basic premise of those aimed at the developing world:
that to understand how the community operates, we must first understand its
governance structure. This results from the presumption by many in law and
policy arenas that the presence of local governments, planning commissions,
and laws also means that those governments, commissions, and laws truly
govern rural places. It is the argument of this article that, in some rural
123. Id.
124. Id. at 959-61. Chambers identifies methods used in development countries as
follows: the presence of secondary sources; semi-structured interviews; finding key
informants and social mapping; group interviews and activities; do-it-yourself activities
taught or performed; they-do-it where residents do the researchers work; participatory
analysis of secondary sources, such as aerial maps or land tenure; transect walks to identify
different soils, land uses, and so on; oral histories; seasonal community calendars; identifying
groups or rankings of households according to wealth or well-being; analysis of difference,
such as by gender, wealth/poverty, or group identity; key probes, or questions that lead to
direct key issues, such as “What do you talk about when you are together?”; stories, portraits
and case studies; participatory planning and budgeting; group discussions and brainstorming;
and short questionnaires.
125. N. Narayanasamy, Evolution of Participatory Rural Appraisal, in PARTICIPATORY
RURAL APPRAISAL: PRINCIPLES, METHODS AND APPLICATION 7–10 (2009).
126. Id. at 25.
127. See, e.g., PEACE CORPS, PUB. NO. M0053, PARTICIPATORY ANALYSIS FOR COMMUNITY
ACTION (PACA) TRAINING MANUAL (2007), https://files.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf
/library/PACA-2007.pdf; KAREN SCHOONMAKER FREUDENBERG, RURAL RAPID APPRAISAL
(RRA) AND PARTICIPATORY RURAL APPRAISAL (PRA): A MANUAL FOR CRS FIELD WORKERS
AND PARTNERS (2008).
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communities, those governmental trappings hide more important informal
governance structures. Disaster planning needs to uncover such informal
governance and find a way to empower it, along with the formal government
structures, if it is to be effective. Disaster planning can only do that when it
is aware of those informal governance structures. The easiest, and quickest,
way to uncover those is likely to incorporate something like a PRA into the
earliest parts of a disaster planning process.
The chief argument in this article—that rural communities utilize
informal governance structures often at the expense of maintaining
functional local governments—do not afford an easy response for those
federal or state agencies seeking to offer assistance to rural communities.
Nonetheless, a greater cognizance of this issue can help those agencies
working in rural communities to make better use of planning resources and
funds. At a minimum, we suggest that federal and state agencies adopt both
a rapid assessment tool for rural local government abilities and a rapid
assessment tool that would seek out alternative forms of power in local
communities. These rapid assessment tools could be modeled on
participatory rural appraisals utilized in developing countries for similar
purposes.
VIII. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, EVEN IN THE PRESENCE
OF STRONG INFORMAL LOCAL GOVERNANCE
While rural local communities may gain some autonomy by investing
in informal governance as opposed to formal local government processes,
such an approach can also backfire in unexpected ways. Chief among them,
antiquated or poorly drafted comprehensive plans and zoning codes can
make it hard to refuse massive developments that may alter the community
in ways that go against the wishes of even a majority of the local
community. Many rural communities have learned this lesson when mines,
server farms, animal feeding operations, or other large-scale developments
come to town. When local comprehensive plans and zoning do not
anticipate such development, the mere application of a large-scale
development can mean it is too late to address such issues, because due
process and equal protection will likely ensure that the project will be
judged according to the un-anticipating, lax development standards. Further,
while sophisticated jurisdictions—even rural ones—could still utilize
discretion in the development process to defeat an unwanted project, the
communities that have given short shrift to government almost certainly will
be unable to marshal the necessary skills to defeat a development that is
willing to go to litigation.
Idaho City’s comprehensive plan again provides for an interesting
example. While the comprehensive plan was adopted by the City Council in
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2013, the city clerk did not know of its existence, and the plan was never
distributed or used as a guide for planning decisions128. In addition, the plan
refers to a “Land Use Designation Map” that was never prepared.129 Finally,
the Planning and Zoning Committee that was formed with the purpose of
updating the comprehensive plan and the development of a new planning
and zoning ordinance, never actually developed a planning and zoning
ordinance. Residents were not too concerned about this since they were
mostly interested in protecting the historic character of downtown, which
was achieved through Historic District Guidelines that were developed by
the Historic Preservation Committee.130 While approval for development
within the historic district required approval by the Historic Preservation
Committee, the enforceability of the “guidelines” is questionable and would
probably not hold up to a legal challenge.131
In another case, Boise County, Idaho, (a small population, rural
community not associated with Boise City, which is in Ada County) was
sued under the Fair Housing Act132 after it entered an order imposing
conditions on the CUP that were illegal and discriminatory under the Act. At
trial, a jury rendered a verdict against the county of $4 million,133 which has
left the small rural county reeling and left it to file for bankruptcy.134
As a final example, residents in Flathead County, Montana, recently
passed an initiative to try to zone out a proposed bottling facility, but only
after the facility had already received most of its other necessary permits.135
Clearly, the community had not anticipated the intensity of development.
128. It is not completely clear when the comprehensive plan was adopted since it has no
date of adoption on it. The document only states that is was prepared by the Planning and
Zoning Committee that was established in 2010.
129. Since the land use map is a required element of a comprehensive plan under Idaho’s
land use statute, Idaho City’s comprehensive plan is null and void. See Idaho Code § 67–
6508(e) (2018) (“A map shall be prepared [as part of a comprehensive plan] indicating
suitable projected land uses for the jurisdiction.”).
130. In researching this article, the authors found that based on our assessment of the
shortcomings of their comprehensive plan, the City has now created a land use map and is at
the brink of adopting a zoning ordinance.
131. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601 et seq. (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–223).
132. Id.
133. Betsy K. Russell, County Hit with $4 Million Verdict for Obstructing Home for
Troubled Teens, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW
(Dec. 20, 2010, 7:24 PM),
http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2010/dec/20/county-hit-4m-jury-verdict-overobstructing-proposed-home-troubled-teens/.
134. In re Boise County, 465 B.R. 156 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 2011).
135. Patrick Reilly, Flathead County Zoning Initiative Passes, but Bottling-plant
Controversy Continues, THE MISSOULIAN (June 6, 2018), https://missoulian.com/news/local
/flathead-county-zoning-initiative-passes-but-bottling-plant-controversy-continues/article
_fce06616-a09d-563b-90c5-33e0353451c9.html.
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That left it scrambling when a sophisticated and potentially litigious
developer came forward with a project that proved controversial but for
which existing planning documents provided no discretionary review.
In the wildfire planning context, this means that any community
interested in wildfire planning cannot simply forsake the formalities of
government entirely. If communities want new projects to plan for
wildfire—especially projects where the developer may come from outside of
the community—the formal legal processes must be put in place to ensure
the community has a say in how its future development plans for wildfire.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In The Concept of Law, the legal theorist HLA Hart argues that, “[i]t is
plain that only a small community closely knit by ties of kinship, common
sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable environment, could live
successfully by such a regime of unofficial rules. In any other conditions
such a simple form of social control must prove defective and will require
supplementation in different ways.”136 Hart is almost certainly right; on the
other hand, there remain thousands of small communities in the United
States. In many of those communities, the “unofficial rules” are as
meaningful as what is written in the city code, which may well go
unenforced most of the time. Disregarding the import of this informal
governance has real consequences. As Robert C. Ellickson noted in his book
about Shasta County, California ranchers’ preference for informal rules,
“lawmakers who are unappreciative of the social conditions that foster
informal cooperation are likely to create a world in which there is both more
law and less order.”137
It would be easy for disaster planning to emphasize success by tangible
means: new code provisions, new policies adopted, people attending
workshops. In rural communities, however, emphasizing only those formal
measures is likely to overlook equally or more important informal
governance structures that have deeper roots in the community and which
are likely to yield longer-lasting changes in behavior. Agencies looking to
engage rural communities should make an effort to quickly appraise the
sources of local power beyond the local government. While informal
governance structures do not replace the need for formal local government
policies, the informal governance will almost certainly decide the success of
disaster planning in the community as much, or more, than the tangible and

136. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92 (Oxford University Press, 3d ed. 2012).
137. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
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legal rules that in rural places lack the enforcement mechanisms to ensure
compliance and the results sought.

